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IN· MEMORIAM-JESSE W. CARTER 
ttHe Died As He Lived-Fighting" 
Jesse W. Carter died on March 15, 1959, at the age of seventy years. 
His death was untimely because he was not old. Judge Carter was an age-
less man who enjoyed excellent health until stricken with a heart attack in 
February. He was vigorous and active, both physically and mentally. A 
few days before the reverse which caused his death, he advised close friends 
of his intention to return to the supreme court as soon as he convalesced 
from his heart attack. 
On the day of his passing, his son, Judge Oliver J. Carter of the federal 
court, said to me, "He died as he lived, fighting." This was true .. 
The background of the Justice reveals a continuous struggle over the 
years of his life. Basically, Judge Carter was an advocate. This is in part 
responsible for his great success as a practicing lawyer. It also accounts for 
his strong decisions as a member of the Supreme Court of California. 
Judge Carter was born in the mountains of Trinity County in a remote 
part"of California. His father, a farmer and miner, had migrated to Cali-
fornia from Iowa in the traqitional covered wagon. The family was large 
and the means were most modest. At an early age, Judge Carter went to 
work in the mines. He did not have a formal college education although he 
was an extremely well read and literate man. He married and went to San 
Francisco and worked for the street railroad. His sons, Oliver and Harlan, 
were born in San Francisco, and his daughter, Marian, was born in Redding. 
He elected to study law after his marriage. While working for the rail-
road, he became a student at the Golden Gate School of Law. Judge Carter 
had tremendous capacity for work; he worked in the day time and attended 
law school at IJight time. He committed the United States Constitution to 
memory while working at a bench in the railroad shop. 
It is commonplace to refer to one as a self-made man. Probably no one 
more deservedly carries this appellation than Judge Carter. He studied law 
under most adverse circumstances. His goal was achieved by reason of hard 
work and sacrifice and with the assistance of his wife and family, who all 
joined in his ambition to become a lawyer and shared in the sacrifices 
necessary to accomplish his purpose. 
Mter Judge Carter finished law school and was admitted to the bar, he 
practiced law in San Francisco for a few months. He then moved to Red-
ding in northern California in 1914 and opened a law office. He continu-
ously practiced law in Redding from 1914 until his appointment to the 
Supreme Court in 1939. 
During his distinguished legal career, Judge Carter held various public 
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offices. He was District Attorney of Shasta County for the two terms from 
1918 and 1926. This was during the Prohibition era. While Shasta County 
was of mining background and liberal in its social attitudes, the District 
Attorney strictly enforced the unpopular liquor law. In those days the law 
enforcement policy in small counties was pretty much determined by the 
District Attorney. Judge Carter took the position that the law should be 
enforced and it was. There was sharp division of thought on this among 
the voters, and the "wets" waged a vigorous campaign to defeat him when 
he ran for re-election. Carter won at the polls, however, by six votes, and 
weathered an election contest in court when his margin was increased to 
eleven votes. 
As District Attorney, he vigorously enforced other laws pertaining to 
county government. As advisor to the board of supervisors, he held illegal 
a printing bill of a newspaper on the basis that one of the members of the 
board held a chattel mortgage on the paper and that the contract was illegal 
because of this conflict of interest. After protracted and bitter litigation, 
the Supreme Court sustained the District Attorney. 
Judge Carter always obtained great satisfaction from a remark made 
by one of his political opponents concerning his conduct of the office of Dis-
trict Attorney. An out-of-town acquaintance asked a local citizen what kind 
of a job Carter was doing as District Attorney. The reply was: "He is con-
victing the guilty, and making it damned hot for the innocent." 
In 1922 Judge Carter commenced on behalf of a group of farmers a 
series of lawsuits against the Pacific Gas and Electric Company over water 
rights on the Pit River in Shasta County. The power company had diverted 
the waters of the river for power uses. The cases were finally concluded in 
1938. They were before the Supreme Court on many occasions and many 
principles of riparian law were clarified and to some extent developed in 
these cases. It was a source of great pride to the Judge that during all the 
years of this litigation the original complaints filed by him never required 
amendment or revision. With sixteen years of litigation, against the most 
formidable lawyers in California, this lawyer from a small town was able 
to sustain his original complaint in a most complex course of litigation. To 
those who still feel that pleadings have an important office in framing and 
defining legal issues, the pride of the Judge in his pleadings is quite under-
standable. 
Without doubt Judge Carter was one of the finest trial lawyers in Cali-
fornia. And this was so even though he practiced in a small community. 
He had many cases of great import. As a lawyer he pioneered the way and 
successfully advocated many new principles before the higher courts. 
His knowledge of water law was outstanding. Likewise was his famili-
arity with the engineering and techniques of the use of water. In examining 
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engineers he knew their language and could not be diverted by evasive 
answers or inapplicable generalizations. 
For many years Judge Carter served as city attorney for Mount Shasta 
in Siskiyou County. This city was in great financial distress as a result of 
an imprudent assessment bond issue. Over the years the Judge successfully 
assisted in disposing of much of the financial problem, and on his appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court, the community was in a healthy condition and 
has, since then, continued to improve. 
As a lawyer, Judge Carter served as special counsel to several public 
agencies. He conducted litigation on behalf of the City of Redding to sus-
tain its right to own and operate its own water distribution system. Because 
of certain federal questions involved, this litigation was not ended until the 
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. This cause serves as an 
example of his ability and ingenuity in wholly unrelated fields of law. The 
water company attacked the city in the state courts on the basis that the 
bond issue proceedings were irregular; in the federal courts on the grounds 
that a federal grant contravened the federal constitution; before a federal 
administrative agency on the charge that the design of the proposed water 
system was improper and unsound; and, before a state administrative 
agency on the ground that the city should not be permitted to divert water 
from the Sacramento River because the riparian rights of lower users would 
be adversely affected. The capacity and resourcefulness of the Judge was 
well demonstrated in his successful defense of the city's position before all 
of the courts and agencies involved. 
Among his other legal assignments was that of attorney for the State 
Dental Board. Much of the early law pertaining to the jurisdiction and 
authority of this board was developed in cases handled by the Judge as its 
attorney. Among one attracting great public attention was the famous 
"Painless Parker" case. 
Likewise, he served on the board of governors of the State Bar in its 
embryo years. He was most active in bar work and continued this interest 
until his appointment to the court. 
He contributed to his own community in many ways. He organized and 
was the first president of the Redding Rotary Club. He was an honorary 
member of this club at the time of his death. 
He likewise initiated the movement to start the Boy Scouts in Redding. 
In this work, he not only contributed financially, but he and Mrs. Carter 
conducted trips to the mountains for the training and pleasure of the boys. 
As a private citizen the Judge led a movement in Redding to acquire the 
distribution system of the power company serving electrical energy to the 
community. The matter was one of bitter controversy, but the community 
ultimately took over the facilities and has operated them successfully ever 
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since. Redding was the first city in California to utilize a special provision 
of law authorizing the city to exercise a right of eminent domain in such 
instances. The participation of the Judge in this program was consistent 
with his belief in the right of people to exercise rights of ownership in the 
public utility field, particularly where natural resources were used for pro-
duction purposes. 
Justice Carter possessed a fierce loyalty to his friends. This was not a 
transitory feeling, nor was it dependent on continued close contact. Many 
of his past associates have been, over the years, the beneficiaries of his de-
votion. It seemed that he enjoyed the successes of his former associates 
even more than his own. He was completely unselfish in this respect. 
A personal experience perhaps might be permitted. Shortly before his 
appointment to the bench, the famous Pit River cases were finally com-
pleted and the payments in settlement were made. The total involved was 
in the neighborhood of 350,000 dollars, which in 1938 was a substantial 
sum of money, and certainly so for a small country office. In celebration, 
the clients and others connected with the cases joined in a dinner party. 
The writer had just completed his first jury case and, likewise, his first con-
demnation case. The jury was deliberating during the dinner and arrived 
at its verdict while the dinner was under way. The issue in the case was 
whether the state should pay sixty-two dollars for a right of way in accord-
ance with its contentions, or 900 dollars as contended by the property owner 
whom we represented, or some amount between these two figures. Youth 
has its advantages in court, as elsewhere, and the jury brought in a verdict 
of 850 dollars. On our return to the party the first to meet us at the door 
was the Judge with an anxious inquiry concerning the result. On learning 
of the verdict he immediately went into unrestrained and joyous laughter 
for which he was famous. His praise was lavish, and he proudly announced 
that the victory compared with the larger case, that only the figures were 
different. This may seem unreal as written, but it is still accurate and fac-
tual. The Judge was not given particularly to direct praise and to a young 
lawyer his expressions on this occasion were of great significance and pleas-
ure. Twenty-five years later they are of greater importance. 
In his earlier life the Judge was a student of literature and poetry. He 
could quote at length from the works of many of the great poets and philos-
ophers. Frequently, on late trips through the mountain areas of northern 
California, he would entertain us with recitations from the works of the 
literary men of the past. One of his favorites was Ingersoll. He could quote 
almost everything he wrote. His favorite passage was: 
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Justice is the only worship. 
Love is the only priest. 
Ignorance is the only slavery. 
Happiness is the only good. 
The time to be happy is now. 
The place to be happy is here. 
The way to be happy is to make other people happy. 
357 
As a lawyer the Judge had a burning desire to be a member of the 
Supreme Court of California. He considered this to be his ultimate goal. 
In 1938 he was elected to the state senate at a special election. He served 
here only until 1939 when Governor Culbert Olson appointed him to the 
supreme court. 
In keeping with tradition, however, even this was not without obstacles. 
A provision of the state constitution forbids the appointment of a member 
of the legislature to a non-elective state office. This provision had been used 
to dissuade other members of the legislature on past occasions from accept-
ing a court appointment. Some legal minds contended that the Supreme 
Court was not an elective office because of the California system wherein 
the voters only passed on whether the incumbent should be retained and 
there were no other candidates on the ballot. The Judge met the issue and 
accepted the appointment. By appropriate legal proceedings he established 
the legal principle that the office was elective and that a member of the 
legislature was eligible to receive the appointment. The Judge was seated 
on the Supreme Court in 1939. His son Oliver succeeded him in the senate 
as a result of another special election in the fifth senatorial district. Oliver 
remained a member of the senate until his voluntary retirement in 1949. 
He is now a distinguished judge of the United States District Court in San 
Francisco. This is one of the few, if perhaps not the only instance in Cali-
fornia history, of a father and son holding contemporaneously two of the 
highest judicial positions in the state. Needless to say, the Judge was most 
proud of the accomplishments of his son. 
To many, Judge Carter, from a personal point of view, went onto the 
court too soon. He was at the height of his career as a lawyer. Even though 
he practiced in the country, he possessed a statewide reputation. There were 
for him broad vistas ahead. He was comparatively young, being only fifty 
years of age. He was much younger than his years and possessed boundless 
energy with a great capacity for work. 
He wanted to be a judge of the Supreme Court and financial considera-
tions were unimportant to him. He was vigorous on the court and once he 
determined as a judge how a case should be decided, he again became an 
advocate to have his views adopted. On occasions, by expressing his dis-
agreement with his associates, his language was strong and perhaps mis-
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understood. However, he always maintained a great respect and personal 
affection for his associates on the court; perhaps even to a greater degree 
than they realized. 
There can be no doubt that the Judge on occasion was a severe victim 
of nostalgia, and many believed that he yearned to return to the arena of 
the courtroom. He was a warrior and it was most natural that he would 
want to return to the battlefield. At the time of his passing he was formu-
lating plans to retire from the court in about two years and re-enter prac-
tice on a limited basis. 
One of the greatest attributes of the Judge from a professional point of 
view was his interest in young lawyers. He took great pride in having a part 
in the development of a young man. Many have benefitted from his guid-
ance. Association with the Judge was no sinecure. As a practitioner he was 
an extremely hard worker, and he put in many days at his office of twelve 
hours or longer. He had an aptitude for bringing young men along to their 
full capacity but without detailed direction. Results were the object, and 
he did not believe in hand-feeding those working for him. However, he was 
constantly abreast of the work in his office and he had an unusual faculty 
of delegating as much responsibility as an apprentice could handle. He 
expected the work to be done completely and without error. There was no 
place in his life or office for indolence or mediocrity. The end product must 
be first class and one that would stand the test in court. The details of per-
formance were left to individual initiative and it irked him to be requested 
to give constant direction. He was known on occasions to leave in a reason-
ably conspicuous place the Message to Garcia so that the young men could 
read or reread it. 
For one whose practice was always in a small community, it is believed 
that the Judge has a fair amount of fruit to show for his work with young 
men. There are three able judges now serving in various courts who were 
formerly associated with him, namely, Judge Richard B. Eaton of the 
Shasta County Superior Court, Judge Samuel F. Finley of the Del Norte 
Superior Court, and his son Oliver of the United States District Court. In 
addition, there are at least four reasonably successful lawyers who obtained 
their original training in practice under his watchful eye. 
The Judge possessed a great sense of humor and loved to exchange 
yarns with his friends. He had a hearty laugh and he almost shook the raft-
ers on occasion in reminiscing of experiences of the past. He always con-
sidered that the greatest compliment he ever received as a lawyer was from 
a justice of the peace in a remote township in Siskiyou. This resulted in a 
case in which he was defending a man of the mountains for allegedly taking 
a deer out of season. It was a jury trial. The case of prosecution was weak, 
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and on its conclusion the defendant's lawyer made a strong argument that 
the court should dismiss the case without the necessity of the defendant's 
producing evidence. The argument was concluded near noon time and the 
motion of dismissal was denied by the court and a recess was taken until 
afternoon for further evidence. When the justice of the peace left the bench 
he passed the table of the defendant's lawyer. As he did, he whispered: "I 
had a good mind to grant your motion, Mr. Carter, but I figured if I did 
I would be deprived of the opportunity to hear your argument to the jury 
and I don't want to miss that." 
Judge Carter believed deeply in the rights of citizens and jealously re-
sisted any unwarranted infringements of the liberties of people. Many of 
his decisions on the Supreme Court reflect this philosophy It was not a new 
one with him, nor was it one from which he ever deviated. He was com-
pletely dedicated to the view that governments often tend in the interests 
of expediency to deprive people of their individual liberties. He was equally 
dedicated to a constant alertness to and resistance of such practices. Some 
of these matters perforce are of degree and admit of an honest difference of 
opinion. The views of the Judge were honest, forthright and unyielding. 
Those who would justify the means by the end to be accomplished and thus 
whittle away private rights were consistently met at the threshold by the 
Judge and resistance continued to the back door if necessary. 
All of us are a little more secure in our rights and homes by reason of 
the devotion of Judge Carter to our cause. 
Daniel S. Carlton* 
*A.B., 1931, Uruversity of Califorrua, LL.B., 1934, Uruversity of Califorrua. Member of 
the California bar. Mr. Carlton was formerly assOCIated with Justice Carter m the practice of 
law in Redding, California. 
ffHe Never Declined to Do Battle for His Convictions" 
The writer did not know Judge Carter personally, but a review of his 
opinions in tort cases indicates that he was what is known as a "Jeffersonian 
liberal," a "common law lawyer," a devout believer in jury trial, a zealous 
and powerful advocate in behalf of the "underdog" usually identified ·by 
him as a plaintiff. These characteristics are quite consistent with each other 
and are exemplified throughout his judicial career by direct and rugged 
statement that no one can misunderstand. 
A Liberal 
The term "liberal" is used in many senses. As applied to Judge Carter it 
means respect for the rights of the individual, protection under law against 
injuries inflicted upon him, and full recognition of his political rights. In 
recent years the courts have been called upon to protect people against 
oppressive legislation which denied them their political rights. The victims 
of this legislation found a strong defender in Judge Carter. In Takahashi 
'V. Fish and Game Comm'n1 his dissent would have struck down a statute 
denying fishing rights to a certain class of aliens. In Sei Fujii 'V. California,2 
concurring with the court in striking down an act denying Japanese aliens 
the right to own land, he noted that Takahashi had been reversed by the 
United States Supreme Court.3 In Gospel Army 'V. City of Los Angeles,4 
he dissented from the court's decision upholding an ordinance requiring a 
religious society to secure a permit and submit to certain regulations in 
order to collect gifts of goods for distribution to the poor. In Perez 'V. Sharp6 
he concurred with a majority of the court in striking down the state's anti-
miscegenation statute. In Danskin 'V. San Diego School Dist.6 he concurred 
in the opinion of Judge Traynor denying the power of school authorities 
to require a loyalty oath as a condition for the use of school buildings for 
public meetings. Later he dissented in cases upholding loyalty oaths for 
public employees,7 and in Haggerty 'V. Associated Farmers of California8 
he dissented from the court's decision upholding an ordinance prohibiting 
use of sound trucks on highways. Again in First Unitarian Church 'V. 
County of Los Angeles9 he dissented from the court's decision sustaining 
130 Ca1.2d 719, 185 P.2d 805 (1947). 
238 Ca1.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). 
3 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
427 Cal.2d 232,163 P.2d 704 (1945), rev'd, 331 U.S. 543 (1947). 
532 Ca1.2d 711,198 P.2d 17 (1948). 
628 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946). 
7Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952). 
844 Cal.2d 60, 279 P.2d 734 (1955). 
948 Cal.2d 419, 311 P .2d 508 (1957). 
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the requirement of a loyalty oath as a basis of tax exemption. A like dissent 
is found in Speiser v. Randall.10 The decisions in both cases were subse-
quently reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.ll He con-
curred with the court in holding the Board of Education's action in firing 
an instructor who took the fifth amendment in an inquiry concerning com-
munist activities as lacking in due processP Judge Carter's dissent was on 
the ground that the statute was unconstitutional. 
His course of liberalism in the protection of other rights is as consistent 
as in the area of political rights. His uncompromising attitude towards the 
California "retraction" statute, in cases of libel by newspapers, is indicated 
by dissents in Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers13 and 
Pridonoff v. Balokovich.14 His opinion in Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club,15 
giving a person denied his rights under the California civil rights statute a 
remedy by injunction as well as the penalty provided by statute, plus actual 
and exemplary damages, has been of great value to other courts and has 
met overwhelming professional approval. 
Likewise his opinion in Luthringer v. Moore,16 holding the user of in-
secticides for extermination purposes liable to a person in another part of 
the building for injuries suffered from the escaping poisons, has received 
wide acclaim, extending as it does the highly commendable doctrine of 
Green v. General Petroleum CorpP No less acceptable, no doubt, would 
have been his opinion in Cole v. Rush18 holding a liquor dispenser liable 
for injuries suffered by a wife on account of plying her husband with excess 
drink, had the court not set its first decision aside and held to the contrary.1~ 
In this case all the rules of tort law pointed to liability, but the courts gen-
erally have denied liability on the basis that the drinking and not the selling 
of the liquor was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Of course this 
is merely judicial camouflage for the undiscussed and important policies 
which underlie the decision. In some types of cases courts refuse to discuss 
the controlling policies, and here the policies are such that judges can hardly 
be criticised for sticking closely to precedent, however weak it may be. 
Judge Carter seldom hesitated to extend tort law to meet the emergen-
cies of the case. He thought of legal doctrine as a means by which to accom-
10 48 Cal.2d 903, 311 P.2d 546 (1957). 
11 First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles County, 357 U.S. 545 (1958) ; Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
12 Board of Education v. Mass, 47 Cal.2d 494,304 P.2d 1015 (1956). 
13 35 Cal.2d 121, 216 P .2d 825 (1950). 
14 36 Cal.2d 788, 228 P.2d 6 (1951). 
15 30 Cal.2d 110, 180 P.8d 321 (1947). 
16 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948). 
17 205 Cal. 328,270 Pac. 952 (1928). 
18 271 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1954). 
19 Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955). 
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plish justice-protection of the victim against injury wrongfully inflicted 
upon him. In Summers v. Tice20 he exemplifies his great resourcefulness in 
finding a way to meet legal doctrine that would have stopped most judges 
in their tracks. Plaintiff, a companion of two other hunters who fired their 
guns simultaneously at a bird, was hit in the eye with one shot. His com-
panions were concededly negligent in shooting in the direction of plaintiff. 
But whose shot hit him? Here was a simple but difficult question of causal 
relation. Judge Carter found more than one way to hold either or both 
defendants. Nothing other than a reading of the opinion can disclose his 
masterly craftsmanship which commands the admiration of every torts 
class in the country. 
Summers v. Tice has an echo in subsequent cases. In Warner v. Santa 
Catalina CO.21 Judge Carter reversed a judgment of nonsuit in favor of the 
manufacturer of cartridges used in a shooting gallery where plaintiff, a by-
stander, was struck in the eye by a particle of metal. The evidence was 
meagre indeed on the issue of causal relation and on negligence, but in fire-
arm cases Judge Carter adhered closely to the common law rule of strict 
liability with the burden on the defendant to exculpate himself.22 He fully 
developed his adherence to this theory in his separate opinion in Jensen v. 
Minarfi23 in which the court transferred its early common law basis of lia-
bility in firearm cases to a negligence basis supported by res ipsa loquitur. 
There is not too much difference in the ultimate results under either theory, 
though Judge Carter's history is probably correct. 
In Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System24 Judge Carter reduced 
the test of infringement in the area of literary property to the reactions of 
the average reasonable man upon the reading or examination of the two 
productions. But his simple formula did not last,25 and in Desny v. Wildero 
he was greatly distressed by the "involved and confusing" process, as he 
thought, the court had developed in dealing with infringement and related 
problems. His liberal attitude toward the injured victim is demonstrated in 
numerous other cases. His dissent would have extended a railroad's duty 
to make search and render aid to an employee who had fallen from a train.27 
He sought the expansion of workmen's compensation to cover wilful mis-
2033 Cal.2d 80,199 P.2d 1 (1948). 
21 44 Ca1.2d 310,282 P.2d 12 (1955). 
22 Tucker v. Lombardo, 47 Cal.2d 457,303 P.2d 1041 (1956). 
23 44 Cal.2d 325, 282 P.2d 7 (1955). 
24 35 Cal.2d 653, 221 P .2d 73 (1950). 
25 See Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., 40 Cal.2d 823, 256 P.2d 933 (1953); Kurlan v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, 40 Cal.2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953); Weitzenkom v. Lesser, 
40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953). 
26 46 Cal.2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956). 
27 Anderson v. A.T.& S.F. Ry., 31 Cal.2d 117, 187 P.2d 729 (1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 821 
(1948). 
L.J.214 (1958). 
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open every case that comes to court. Moreover he had developed great facil-
ity in using the weapons of the law, stroke and counter stroke. This knowl-
edge and facility gave him remarkable powers as an advocate. His advocacy 
breathes the atmosphere of the trial court, a sense of outrage at the injus-
tice done his client. From no other source could he have acquired the strong 
words of his dissenting opinions. In the Supreme Court when he had made 
up his mind as to the justness of the cause, his advocacy for the position 
he took assumed all the color of his trial experience. Apparently he had no 
greater joy than springing to the kill of some error he found in the opposing 
position. He was no mere jabber; he swung with all his might. 
Perhaps Judge Carter would be considered a plaintiff's judge, an advo-
cate for the underdog. In part this was no doubt due to his liberal philoso-
phy. But there was a deeper base. As a student of the common law he knew 
that the early history of tort law was based on the principle that one who 
hurts another should compensate him for his hurt. He knew that during the 
great era of the industrial revolution this principle was greatly modified 
through the development of the law of negligence.3s He knew and had wit-
nessed the reaction to the weakness of negligence law which set in during 
the late 1800s and the accelerated speed it has attained in recent years, re-
sulting in the modification of negligence law and, in many instances, in the 
sweeping away of the numerous immunities under which wrongdoers es-
caped liability to their victims. This reaction accorded with his liberal 
philosophy and he himself, as practitioner and judge, labored mightily to 
remold negligence law to meet the urgencies created by the dangerous ac-
tivities and machines of modern life. 
Judge Carter came to know that the rules of procedure and refinements 
of negligence law, as is true in equity, are designed to the ends of justice 
and not to defeat justice. His keen mind made him realize that no rule of 
tort law could decide any case where the facts were complicated or in dis-
pute. He learned from experience that the facts of a case are of the highest 
importance and that their alignment and interpretation by trial judge, jury 
and appellate court are the controlling factors in nearly every case. It was 
thus that in writing for the court, in concurring and in dissenting opinions, 
he so patiently and thoroughly regimented the facts of a case and sought to 
bring his interpretation of the facts under some theory, rule or practice 
that supported what he considered the just decision. This attitude toward 
facts made him place great reliance on the verdicts of juries. He was at war 
with doctrinal refinements which permit a trial judge to control juries by 
surreptitiously charging on the weight of evidence under guise of stating a 
rule of law, and which are as frequently used by appellate courts to sap the 
functions of the trial judge and jury. Perhaps Judge Carter's devotion to 
38 See GREEN, TRAFFIc VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958). 
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jury trial is the most pronounced phase of his judicial performance. Of his 
contemporaries doubtless only Mr. Justice Black has a place with him in 
the top bracket of reverence for jury trial. His loyalty to it as an institu-
tion seemingly never faltered or lost its edge. 
In scores of cases Judge Carter argues for the rule of "reasonable 
minds" as one for the jury, and against the trial or appellate court's taking 
over the jury's functions.39 His advocacy seems to reach its peak in sus-
taining a verdict, whether for plaintiff or defendant.40 His resourcefulness 
in argument is indeed remarkable.41 Even though he agreed with the de-
cision of the majority he seldom passed the opportunity to set forth his 
views if he disagreed with their reasoning.42 The weight to be given the vio-
lation of a traffic statute or ordinance in negligence cases has given courts 
everywhere much trouble. The California courts are no exception. Judge 
Carter's common law breeding apparently influenced him to insist that the 
violation of a statute should be tested by the conduct of a person of ordi-
nary prudence, as determined by a jury.43 Incidentally, in recent years 
courts generally are turning in this direction. Judge Carter, concurring in 
the dissent of Judge Spence, thought this to be the test in the case of leaving 
the key in the ignition of a car.44 
Res Ipsa Loquitur 
It is doubtful that any other court has accorded res ipsa loquitur SO 
much importance as has the California court. The well known Ybarra415 
and Dierman46 cases, together with the more recent attempt to stabilize the 
doctrine in Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 47 have made the doctrine an im-
89 Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal.2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955) j Callahan v. Gray, 44 Cal.2d 
107, 279 P.2d 963 (1955) j Shoemaker v. WIlsey, 43 Cal.2d 686, 277 P.2d 17 (1954) j Gray v. 
Brinkerhoff, 41 Cal.2d 180, 258 P.2d 834 (1953) j Goodman v. Harris, 40 Cal.2d 254, 253 P.2d 
447 (1953) j Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School Dist., 40 Cal.2d 207, 253 P.2d 1 (1953). 
40 Kircher v. A.T.& S.F. Ry., 32 Cal.2d 176, 195 P.2d 427 (1948) j Rice v. California 
Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal.2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1955) j Kirk v. Los Angeles Ry., 26 CaI.2d 833, 
161 P.2d 673 (1945) j Polk v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 519,159 P.2d 931 (1945). 
41 Hilyar Union Ice Co., 45 CaI.2d 30,286 P.2d 21 (1955) j Austin v. Riverside Portland 
Cement Co., 44 Cal.2d 225, 282 P.2d 69 (1955) j Barrett v. City of Claremont, 41 CaI.2d 70, 
256 P.2d 977 (1953) j Brokaw v. BIack-Foxe Military Institute, 37 Cal.2d 274, 231 P.2d 816 
(1951) j Finnegan v. Royalty Realty Co., 35 CaI.2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950) j Moore v. Belt, 
34 Ca1.2d 525,212 P.2d 509 (1949). 
42 Clement v. St.'lte Reclamation Board, 35 Cal.2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950) j Sebrell v. 
Los Angeles Ry., 31 Cal.2d 813, 192 P.2d 898 (1948) j Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal.2d 1, 187 P.2d 
752 (1947) j Combs v. Los Angeles Ry., 29 Cal.2d 606,177 P.2d 293 (1947). 
4SM&M Livestock Transp. v. California Auto Transp. Co., 43 Ca1.2d 847, 279 P.2d 13 
(1955) j Saterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Ca1.2d 581,177 P.2d 279 (1947). 
44 Richards v. Stanley, 43 CaI.2d 60, 271 P .2d 23 (1954). 
45 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486,154 P.2d 687 (1944). 
46 Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal.2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947). 
4142 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954). 
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portant factor in many cases. It was a favorite with Judge Carter, and with 
his great ability to analyze the facts he could sustain the plaintiff's case in 
many instances where the court found the doctrine either not available or 
else overcome by countervailing evidence. These cases must have raised 
Judge Carter's blood pressure for his aruments supporting jury determina-
tion of the issue were frequently throbbing with outrage.48 They indicate 
how difficult it is to give res ipsa loquitur a uniform meaning, even proce-
durally in every case, and no one thinks it can be given a uniform weight 
substantively. The attempt to do either requires nice refinements and 
sooner or later results in confusion. 
Circumstantial evidence must necessarily vary in weight in different 
cases and this applies as well to circumstantial evidence characterized as 
res ipsa loquitur. The same is true or should be true of its procedural effect. 
The same phenomena are found in the weight and procedural effect to be 
given the violation of a statute or ordinance. Calling such violation negli-
gence per se only involves a court in deeper trouble. Res ipsa loquitur and 
negligence per se are in fact twin doctrines, one operating in the common 
law field, the other in the statutory field. The violation of a statute also 
speaks for itself. But what does it say? In one case it may merely whisper 
while in another it may scream, as is true of res ipsa loquitur. But in every 
such case of common law or statutory negligence there are other facts which 
are not spoken by the mere happening. It is becoming quite common to 
treat statutory violations as res ipsa loquitur cases, and this gives point to 
Judge Carter's testing of statutory violations by the common law rule of 
negligence. The law would not lose much if both doctrines were thrown 
overboard, as the courts could deal with the situations characterized by 
both doctrines under their common law powers. But there is no likelihood 
that the doctrines will be thrown into discard: This may be speaking too 
quickly. The California court, in the recent case of Brandelius v. City and 
County of San Francisco,49 has discarded the false doctrine of "unavoid-
48 Trust v. Arden Farms, 50 Ca1.2d 217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958) (broken milk bottIe) ; Phillips 
v. Noble, 50 Cal.2d 163, 323 P.2d 385 (1958) (majority held that "happening of accident no 
evidence of negligence" instruction not inconsistent with res ipsa loquitur when no instruction 
requested, but would be inconsistent if res ipsa loquitur arose as a matter of law) ; Barrera v. 
De La Torre, 48 Ca1.2d 166, 308 P.2d 724 (1957) (car crossed curb into plaintiff's house; 
P did not request instruction on res ipsa loquitur, and charge of presumption of no negligence 
given for the defendant); Danner v. Atkins, 47 CaI.2d 327, 303 P.2d 724 (1956) (truck rolled 
into plaintiff's cafe); Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal.2d 509, 305 P.2d 36 
(1956) (inference overcome by testimony of adverse witness under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. 
§ 2055); Simmons v. Rhodes & Jameison, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956) (burns re-
sulting from cement) ; Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Farber v. Olkon, 
40 CaI.2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953) (res ipsa loquitur not available to mental patient injured 
while under electric shock treatment). 
49 47 Cal.2d 729, 306 P.2d 432 (1957). 
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able accident," as was protested by Judge Carter in Parker v. Womack.50 
It has also had less and less to say about proximate cause, sole cause and 
other "causes," equally false issues, since the celebrated case of Mosley v. 
Arden Farms.51 If some pages could be torn out of the Book of Approved 
Jury Instructions further progress in this direction might be made, and, 
with a few more lectures like that of Judge Shinn in Werkman v. Howard 
Zinc Corp.52 the progress would be accelerated. 
The recent case of Alarid v. Vanier53 deserves special attention. There 
defendant rammed plaintiff's automobile from the rear. The operation of 
defendant's car was in violation of statute. The collision was characterized 
as a res ipsa loquitur situation. In the suit brought by plaintiff the trial 
court gave the discarded "unavoidable accident" instruction, and the 
"mere-happening-of -the-accident-no-evidence-of -negligence" instruction, 
even though it is error to give such an instruction in a res ipsa loquitur case. 
The jury found for defendant. The court reviewed the violation of statutes 
cases and held the true rule to be: 54 
In our opinion the correct test is whether the person who has violated a 
statute has sustained the burden of showing that he did what might reason'" 
ably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar 
circumstances, who desired to comply with the law. 
This test of course does much to moderate the negligence per se doctrine. 
The court held that the erroneous instructions were non-prejudicial or 
harmless, despite the strong dissents of Judges Carter and Shenk. The case 
is a remarkable example of how American appellate courts have succeeded 
in developing practices that permit them to take the administration of jus-
tice in their own hands. It may well be that even though jury trial is not 
discarded in American courts, in civil cases, as is largely the case in all other 
common law jurisdictions, we may arrive at the same result through the 
growth of appellate power to control jury verdicts. ' 
Last Clear Chance 
Judge Carter was jealous in protecting the last clear chance doctrine. 
He was counsel in Girdner v. Union Oil CO./,5 one of the leading cases of 
the country if its facts be considered and its struggle to make the case rest 
upon proximate and remote cause be disregarded. It is very strange how 
clearly the court states the last clear chance rule in the early part of its 
50 37 Cal.2d 116, 230 P.2d 823 (1951). 
51 26 Cal.2d 213, 157 P.2d 372 (1945). 
52 97 Cal. App.2d 418,218 P.2d 43 (1950). 
53 50 Cal.2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958); c/. Laird v. T. W. Mather, Inc., 51 Ca1.2d. .. -. 
331 P.2d 617 (1958). 
54 Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal.2d 617, 624,327 P.2d 897, 900 (1958). 
55216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932). 
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opinion and then again in the concluding part. Says the court: "The rule of 
the last clear chance means just what the words imply." Truly a doctrine 
based on time sequence too simple to be misunderstood I But the court was 
not satisfied with so simple an answer. It says: "The real issue in cases of 
the character here involved is not whose negligence came first or last, but 
whose negligence, however it cam~, was the proximate cause of the injury." 
Then the payoff: "The real question to be determined in considering cases 
of the chartacter of the one here involved is whether or not the so-called 
continuing negligence is the proximate or remote cause of the injury, which 
question is determined by the application of the principles of the doctrine 
of the last clear chance itself." Why bother about proximate and remote 
cause if they in turn have to be determined by the last clear chance? The 
court's statement of last clear chance leaves nothing to be added. 'Why were 
not the court and subsequent courts satisfied with this simple and under-
standable statement? If we could answer that question we could say with 
the poet, "we know what God and man is." 
Judge Carter seldom had his way about the application of the doctrine.56 
In Brandelius v. City and County of San Francisco the court affirmed the 
trial court's granting of a new trial for minor defects in the instructions. 
The court thought that the rule as stated in Girdner, after being cuffed 
around for so many years, needed clarification. Judge Carter rejected the 
clarification as confusing and full of inconsistencies. The pride of craftman-
ship no doubt had some effect on his judgment, but it may be that the re-
statement of the rule, as is the case with most restatements, will simply be 
a point of departure for other refinements of the rule as restated. The more 
recent case of Garibaldi v. Borchers Bros.57 seems to bear out this obser-
vation. There the court says:5S 
Before concluding this phase of the discussion we should state that it ap-
pears that any instruction, such as BAJI 20S-A, Third Paragraph, is tech-
nical in nature and is of little, if any, assistance to the average jury in 
applying the last clear chance doctrine. It would be more helpful, in our 
opinion, if the courts would frankly recognize that the last clear chance 
doctrine is in reality an exception to, or modification of, the ordinary rules 
making plaintiff's contributory negligence a bar to plaintiff's recovery. 
Then the court proceeds to add to this very sensible statement the con-
fusing talk of proximate cause. Of course there must be causal relation 
about which there is usually no doubt, but "proximate cause" in this con-
text does not mean causal relation. If there is doubt about causal relation 
56 Doran v. City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal.2d 477,283 P.2d 1 (1955); Sparks 
v. Redinger, 44 Ca1.2d 121,279 P.2d 971 (1955); Daniels v. City and County of San Francisco, 
40 Cal.2d 614, 255 P.2d 785 (1953); Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Ca1.2d 290,246 P.2d 663 (1952); 
Selinsky v. Olsen, 38 Ca1.2d 102, 237 P.2d 645 (1951). 
1i748 Ca1.2d 283, 309 P.2d 23 (1957). 
lisld. at 290, 309 P.2d at 27. 
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it should be submitted to the jury as a separate issue and not be permitted 
to confuse the simple and easily understood concept of last clear chance. 
And it must in fairness be said that the court as indicated by the last sen-
tence in the paragraph from which the quotation is taken is so inclined. 
Both the last clear chance and causal connection are fact inquiries, but for 
clarity they should be kept separate. Suffice it to say that Judge Carter was 
very distressed by the continued restrictive process in the applications of 
the last clear chance doctrine and repeated what he had said in Brandelius. 
This much may be added: The court put its finger on the significance 
of the last clear chance doctrine when it said the doctrine is simply a modi-
fication of the contributory negligence doctrine, the harshest doctrine of 
the common law. At times contributory negligence has represented a sort of 
sanctified harshness. Three rather recent cases of the New York Court of 
Appeals indicate how that court has swung away from the letter of the last 
clear chance rule to the spirit of the rule.59 
Any adequate evaluation of Judge Carter's contribution to tort law 
would be impossible in so brief a study and at this time. This will have to 
await the further development of tort law. It may be, as has been true of 
other great common law judges, that Judge Carter will only gain his full 
stature after death. As indicated by the volume of his output and its clarity 
of thought content, he gave all he had to his work. But what he contributed 
is so much a part of tort law as shaped by the whole court that his full influ-
ence in its shaping can never be known. The opinions he wrote were neces-
sarily influenced by his fellow judges as were those they wrote influenced 
by him. The impression is gained from the development of tort law during 
his tenure that Judge Carter served as a stimulant to his brother judges to 
do their best. They knew they had to be prepared to meet his arguments, 
for no one can say he ever declined to do battIe for his convictions. And 
no doubt the freedom to dissent which he asserted influenced his able asso-
ciates to do likewise, for the reports of no other state court disclose so 
many dissents. Moreover, they do not seem to follow any pattern except 
the individual views of the dissenters. A free court makes for a jurispru-
dence robust with justice. And this must be added. During Judge Carter's 
tenure the court has become the leading court of the country in tort law. 
Being an able and experienced lawyer in this broad field of general law 
he must have had a large share in bringing the California court to this 
preeminence. 
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59 Kunkumian v. City of New York, 305 N.Y. 167, 111 N.E.2d 865 (1953); Chadwick v. 
City of New York, 301 N.Y. 176,93 N.E.2d 625 (1950). Ct. Panarese v. Union Ry., 261 N.Y. 
233,185 N.E. 84 (1933). 
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